In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person's life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent's intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively ''direct" or ''personal". Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent's muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people's real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.
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Introduction
Many moral and political controversies involve a tension between individual rights and the greater good (Singer, 1979 ). This tension is nicely captured by a puzzle known as the ''trolley problem" that has long interested philosophers (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1985) and that has recently become a topic of sustained neuroscientific (Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & di Pellegrino, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006 ) and psychological (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000 Mikhail, , 2007 Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Nichols & Mallon, 2005; Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007) investigation. One version of the trolley problem is as follows: A runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people. In the switch dilemma 1 one can save them by hitting a switch that will divert the trolley onto a side-track, where it will kill only one person. In the footbridge dilemma one can save them by pushing someone off a footbridge and into the trolley's path, killing him, but stopping the trolley. Most people approve of the five-for-one tradeoff in the switch dilemma, but not in the footbridge dilemma (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene et al., 2001; Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993) .
